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BROKEN SYSTEMS, BROKEN DUTIES:
A NEW THEORY FOR SCHOOL
FINANCE LITIGATION
AARON Y. TANG*
In May 2010, a coalition of California students, parents, and school
districts filed a ground-breaking lawsuit alleging that the state’s public
school finance system violates the California constitution. The lawsuit,
Robles-Wong v. California, is not ground-breaking because of its basic
aim; at last count, school finance lawsuits with similar goals have
occurred in forty-four states. Instead, the lawsuit is path-breaking
because of the novel approach plaintiffs used to frame their constitutional
challenge. Historically, plaintiffs have sued state governments using two
legal theories: the equity theory and the adequacy theory. Under the
equity theory, plaintiffs argue that the states distribute school resources in
a disparate manner that violates equal protection of the laws. Under the
adequacy theory, plaintiffs assert that the states deny children their right to
an adequate level of education as guaranteed under the education clauses
in state constitutions. While litigants suing under the equity theory have
lost more cases than they have won, adequacy challenges have met some
success: plaintiffs in adequacy claims have prevailed in two-thirds of the
thirty-three cases in state courts.
In recent years, however, plaintiffs have grown less likely to prevail in
their school finance challenges, losing six of eleven cases decided since
2009. Moreover, as I show in an empirical analysis of school spending
levels in twenty-two states, even those states that have experienced
successful adequacy and equity lawsuits continue to spend less than the
amount necessary to provide their children with a quality education.
Responding to these trends, the Robles-Wong plaintiffs allege a new
and different form of constitutional violation: that the state’s school
finance program violates the state’s constitutional duty to provide a
“system” of common schools because it is not “intentionally, rationally,
and demonstrably aligned” with the educational goals described in
statewide academic content standards. As this Article explains, this
constitutional violation alleged in Robles-Wong, which I call the “broken
system” cause of action, represents a significant evolution in the historic
journey of school finance litigation. In addition to describing the textual
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and legal basis for this new theory, I argue that it builds on the
experiences of its two predecessor theories, responds to important trends
in education policy reform, and offers courts a manageable framework
for ensuring that state school systems are in compliance with the
substantive educational guarantees of state constitutions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
State public school systems throughout the country are failing to
deliver the quality of education they have promised. In New York
State, one out of every three high school freshmen fails to graduate on
1
time, a statistic that is difficult to reconcile with the New York
Education Department’s pledge that “[e]veryone will graduate from
2
high school ready for work, higher education, and citizenship.” Despite
the California Department of Education’s declaration that “the public
school system must meet the comprehensive learning needs of each
3
student to reach high expectations,” only 22% of California eighth
4
graders are able to read at a proficient or advanced level. Worse yet,
for every California eighth grader who reads at an advanced level, there
5
are nineteen eighth graders whose reading ability is below basic. As
6
7
American students fall further behind international peers, and as poor
* J.D., Stanford Law School. I thank Elizabeth Campbell for her constant support;
Professor William S. Koski for his patient guidance; Professors Michael Rebell and Paul
Tractenberg for their thoughtful suggestions and expertise; John Affeldt for spirited
discussion that was vital to the development of this concept; and Ethan Hutt for his
dependable insights.
1. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., HIGH SCHOOL DROPOUT AND COMPLETION RATES IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2007, COMPENDIUM REPORT 21 (2009), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs
2009/2009064.pdf.
2. UNIV. OF THE STATE OF N.Y. & N.Y. STATE BD. OF REGENTS, STATE EDUC. DEPT.,
P-16 EDUCATION: A PLAN FOR ACTION 1 (2006), available at http://www.nfschools.net/
10561053110315997/lib/10561053110315997/P_16_Education_A_Plan_for_Action_2006.pdf
(emphasis added).
3. California Department of Education, Belief & Purpose, http://www.cde.ca.gov/eo/
mn/mv/ (last visited May 18, 2011).
4. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE NATION’S REPORT CARD: READING 2007
STATE SNAPSHOT REPORT: CALIFORNIA GRADE 8 PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2007), available at
http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/stt2007/2007497CA8.pdf.
5. See id.
6. In math, United States’ twelfth graders were outperformed by their counterparts in
sixteen of twenty-one countries that participated in the Third International Math and Science
Study. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PURSUING EXCELLENCE:
A STUDY OF U.S. TWELFTH-GRADE MATHEMATICS AND SCIENCE ACHIEVEMENT IN
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 30 (1998), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs98/twelfth/. In science, United
States’ twelfth graders outperformed only five of twenty-one countries. Id. at 36.
7. In 2009, a child born into the highest quartile of families is ten times more likely to
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8

and minority students continue to encounter devastatingly unequal
educational opportunities and outcomes, it is at best a platitude—and at
worst an understatement—to observe that state public school systems in
America are broken.
Although the end result of the failure of our public school systems is
observable in dismal student outcomes, those failures begin with the
dysfunctional structures that make up the systems themselves. Nowhere
is this dysfunction more obvious than in state school finance schemes,
where the amount of money spent on any particular student’s education
is often the irrational product of an inscrutable web of factors and not
the result of a reasoned calculation of the cost to provide children with a
quality education. Indeed, in any given state, the amount of money
spent on a child’s education is typically influenced by a dizzying array of
input factors. These factors include: three kinds of local property taxes,
each subject to voter approval and state limitations; state tax programs
and lotteries directed, to varying degrees, at school spending; state
political negotiations over funding appropriation levels relative to state
budgetary constraints; state foundation formulas that distribute agreedupon amounts of money based on daily attendance calculations in each
district and various geographic and economic factors; state categorical
programs that target money toward specific programs such as
transportation, vocational education, professional development, school
construction, and special education; and other considerations unique to
9
the various states.
In California, for example, decisions about how much money school
districts should receive and where that money should come from are
made principally by the state legislature and governor as a result of
Proposition 13, which was passed in 1978 to limit the rates at which local

obtain a college degree by age twenty-four than a child born into the lowest quartile of
families. Family Income & Educational Attainment 1970 to 2009, 221 POSTSECONDARY
EDUC. OPPORTUNITY 1, 2 (2010).
8. 1999 National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) scores showed that
seventeen-year-old African-American and Latino students read and do math at roughly the
same level as white thirteen-year-olds. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC., TRENDS IN ACADEMIC PROGRESS: THREE DECADES OF STUDENT PERFORMANCE
33, 35 (2000), available at http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pubs/main1999/2000469.asp.
9. For an overview of state-by-state school finance structures, see generally the NAT’L
CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE PROGRAMS
OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: 1998–99 (2001), http://nces.ed.gov/edfin/state_
financing.asp.
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property taxes could increase. But to set a statewide education budget,
school officials must follow the disjunctive three-part test enacted by
voters in Proposition 98, where the particular test to be applied in any
given year is often unknown until well after school funding is actually
11
distributed, leading to severe unpredictability for students and school
leaders. Even after that amount is identified, it must still be divided up
among districts in two parts: one part based on general purpose funds
tied to “revenue limits” that are the historical byproduct of a 1972
calculation, and a second part based on more than one hundred
12
different categorical programs, each with its own rules. The California
Department of Education itself concedes that “the system is
13
extraordinarily complex and difficult to understand.”
Stanford
University Professor Michael Kirst concludes, “California’s K-12
education finance system is broken in every way. It has no underlying
rationale, is incredibly complex, fails to deliver an equal or adequate
14
education to all children and is a nonsensical historical accretion.”
California is not the only state where the school finance system has
15
been widely denounced as broken. The recent economic downturn has
underscored the erratic manner in which the vast majority of states set
school funding levels, demonstrating that the driving forces behind those
levels are political expediency, geography, and short-term economic
16
realities. Only a handful of states have taken what would seem to be
10. For a brief overview of Proposition 13 and its impact on school spending in
California, see Education Data Partnership, Proposition 13: Property Tax Amendment
(1978), (Mar. 2004), http://www.ed-data.k12.ca.us/articles/article.asp?title=Proposition%2013.
11. See Legislative Analyst’s Office, Proposition 98 Requirement for Budget Year
Uncertain, http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_2009/education/ed_anl09003002.aspx (last visited
May 17, 2011).
12. Michael Kirst, How to Fix California’s Schools: Today’s Method Outdated,
Confusing, Inadequate, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 23, 2003.
13. Education Data Partnership, A Guide to California’s School Finance System, (Apr.
2011), http://www.ed-data.k12.ca.us/articles/article.asp?title=Guide%20to%20California%20
School%20Finance%20System.
14. Kirst, supra note 12.
15. See, e.g., Alan J. Borsuk, MPS to Explore Dissolving District: Money Pressure Brings
Board’s Surprising Vote, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 19, 2008, at A1 (quoting Milwaukee
superintendent announcing, “The state finance system to fund Milwaukee Public Schools is
broken”); Deon Roberts, “Broken” Louisiana Public School System Awaits Leadership
Infusion, NEW ORLEANS CITYBUSINESS, Apr. 25, 2005, at 77 (The local chamber of
commerce president declared, “the [school] system is broken.”).
16. See, e.g., Tim Martin, Deadline Nears for Michigan School Budget Cuts, MLIVE.COM,
Nov. 30, 2009, http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2009/11/deadline_nears_on_michigan_
sch.html.
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the self-evident step of setting school funding levels based on the most
sensible metric: the cost of actually providing a quality education to
17
children.
This Article considers the role of state-level school finance litigation
in solving the problem of arcane state school funding schemes that are
neither rationally calculated to serve student needs in theory, nor
actually serving those needs in reality. In Part II of this Article, I
describe the two legal theories traditionally asserted by plaintiffs in
school finance lawsuits: the equity and adequacy theories. Unlike the
bulk of existing literature already written on the topic, however, the
principle concern of this Article is not to advance an argument in favor
of either of these theories. I describe instead, in Part III, how recent
developments in school reform—the rise of standards-based school
reform and associated “costing-out studies” that calculate the cost of
providing the education described in state standards—have changed the
playing field for school finance litigants. As a result, a new legal
approach is necessary to align state education funding systems with the
real costs of preparing our children for the challenges of the coming
century. In making the case for a new approach, Part III includes a brief
empirical analysis of the impact of adequacy and equity litigation in the
states thus far, concluding that despite the significant gains that the
litigation has produced, a substantial gap still exists between what states
actually spend on K–12 public education and what states ought to spend
to meet their own academic content standards.
In Part IV, I propose a new legal approach that has the potential to
bridge this gap, the broken system theory of school finance litigation. I
explain the textual basis for the broken system theory, which is rooted in
the text of various state constitutional education clauses, and I also
examine relevant case law from state courts that have considered these
clauses so far. I then walk through a test case to demonstrate how this
broken system claim could be litigated in Part V, using California as an
example in light of the recent Robles-Wong filing. Finally, I conclude
17. See, e.g., Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 971 A.2d 989, 996–97, 1009–10 (N.J. 2009)
(approving New Jersey’s School Funding Reform Act, which ties state funding levels to the
cost of providing children with an adequate education, to be in compliance with the state’s
constitutional duty); Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1279 (Wyo. 1995)
(ordering the Wyoming legislature to adopt a school finance program that was based on the
actual cost of providing children the quality of education promised by the state); Access
Quality Education, A Costing Out Primer (June 1, 2006), http://www.schoolfunding.info/
resource_center/costingoutprimer.php3 [hereinafter A Costing Out Primer] (explaining
costing-out studies, which estimate the actual cost of providing a certain level of education).
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with a brief discussion of some of the advantages and challenges of the
broken system theory of school finance litigation.
To preview the argument, this new cause of action is firmly rooted in
18
language present in thirty-six state constitutions that imposes a duty on
states to provide not just public schools in general, but a system of
public schools. I argue that, irrespective of whether a state constitution
guarantees any minimally adequate level of education, the command to
provide a system of schools requires a legislature to create an
educational enterprise composed of programs and policies that are
rationally designed to serve a common purpose. State legislatures have
made it clear that the common purpose to be served by their public
19
school systems is the achievement of academic content standards. All
fifty states have enacted such standards to serve as the foundation of
their school systems, and most have passed additional laws expressly
tying core school policies regarding testing and accountability,
curriculum frameworks, teacher certification, and even textbooks to
20
these standards. By connecting these programs to the standards in a
calculated and rational manner, states have acted in significant
furtherance of their constitutional duty to provide a system of public
schools. But they have failed in one crucial respect: school finance,
which in most states remains wholly unconnected to the delivery of the
standards. A challenge based on a state’s constitutional duty to provide
a system of schools would thus seek a court remedy requiring the state
legislature to align its school funding structure to the actual cost of
providing the level and quality of education described in a state’s
academic content standards.

18. Thirty-six state constitutions require the provision of a “system” of schools: ALA.
CONST. art. XIV, § 256; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1; ARK.
CONST. art. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2; DEL. CONST. art.
X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; ILL.
CONST. art. X, § 1; IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; KY. CONST. § 183; LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1;
MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; NEV.
CONST. art. XI, § 2; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, cl. 1; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1; N.Y. CONST.
art. XI, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2;
OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14; S.C. CONST.
art. XI, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1;
UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2; W. VA.
CONST. art. XII, § 1; and WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
19. See infra Part IV.B.
20. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
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II. THE CURRENT APPROACH: EQUITY AND
ADEQUACY SCHOOL FINANCE LAWSUITS
Under the conventional narrative, school finance litigation in
America has proceeded in three “waves” covering two distinct theories
21
of legal action. The first two waves together comprise the “equity
theory” of school finance lawsuits, which is premised on the idea that
inequitable distribution of school resources violates equal protection of
22
the laws.
The first wave asserted violations of the federal Equal
Protection Clause and ended abruptly with the Supreme Court’s dual
declaration in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez
that education is not a fundamental right and that wealth is not a suspect
23
class. The second wave commenced thereafter in state courts based on
state equal protection guarantees, but was met with only partial success.
Of the thirty-one state supreme courts to consider state equal protection
24
challenges, only fourteen invalidated school finance systems. The
conventional narrative follows that advocates then turned to a third
wave of school finance litigation, the “adequacy” wave, distinguished by
its focus not on equality of educational opportunity but rather on the
state’s duty to provide some absolute, adequate level of education to
25
all. What follows is an overview of the equity and adequacy theories,
along with a discussion of the benefits and drawbacks inherent in each.

21. See William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance
Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597, 598, 600–04 (1994).
But see William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A Re-examination
of the Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 1185, 1188 (2003) (noting how the so-called “waves” of school finance cases are actually
not so distinct); James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation, 86 TEX. L.
REV. 1223, 1229, 1237 n.9 (2008) (arguing that the conventional story of “school finance
litigation is not as neat as the traditional portrait suggests,” because even existing adequacy
litigation has focused a great deal on cross-district disparities at the remedial stage).
22. See Thro, supra note 21, at 600–02.
23. 411 U.S. 1, 28, 40 (1973).
24. Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity, Hollow Victories, and the Demise of
School Finance Equity Theory: An Empirical Perspective & Alternative Explanation, 32 GA.
L. REV. 543, 571 & n.124 (1998).
25. Janet D. McDonald et al., School Finance Litigation & Adequacy Studies, 27 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 69, 69–70, 75–76 (2004).
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A. The Equity Theory
At the beginning of the 1960s, the United States Supreme Court
began to apply the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in a two-tiered fashion, a dichotomy that remains more or
26
less intact to the present day.
State laws that implicate “suspect
classifications” or “fundamental interests” are subject to strict scrutiny,
and are struck down absent a governmental showing that there is a
compelling interest for the law and that the law is the most narrowly
27
tailored way to achieve that interest. State action that does not touch
upon suspect classifications or fundamental interests will be evaluated
under rational basis review, where the state’s action will be upheld so
long as the state possesses a legitimate interest and so long as its action
28
is rationally related to that interest.
Advocates who sought to equalize the amount of educational
resources devoted to low-income and minority children with the amount
offered to their wealthier counterparts reacted to this judicial
framework quickly, suing in both federal and state courts. Their
assertion was two-fold: first, they argued that education is a fundamental
right under the Equal Protection Clause (or that wealth is a suspect
classification) and second, that when subjected to strict scrutiny,
unequal local property tax-based school funding schemes should be
29
struck down for lack of a compelling governmental justification. As a
result, advocates asserted, different districts within a state should not be
able to spend wildly different amounts to educate their children.
Plaintiff students in Rodriguez, for example, lived in Edgewood
Independent School District where only $356 was spent on their
education, compared with students in Alamo Heights School District
30
which had an average annual per-pupil expenditure of $594.
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the Rodriguez plaintiffs’
argument that education is a fundamental interest and wealth a suspect

26. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). Note the exception of
gender-based discrimination, which is evaluated under an intermediate tier of scrutiny in
between strict scrutiny and rationality review. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515, 524 (1996).
27. See Gunther, supra note 26, at 21, 24.
28. Id. at 35.
29. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
30. Id. at 12, 13.
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class, ending the first wave of school finance litigation under the federal
31
Equal Protection Clause.
Undeterred, school finance advocates
renewed their claims under state equal protection provisions, given that
state constitutions typically have their own variants of an equal
32
protection clause that could give separate rise to a cause of action. But
equity litigation met opposition in state courts as well, as a majority of
33
the courts to hear such suits found for state defendants.
The equity theory has been undermined by four main problems.
First, state courts, like the U.S. Supreme Court, have been reluctant to
find education to be a “fundamental interest” for fear that doing so
would lead to a slippery slope whereby any important governmental
program would be subject to strict scrutiny for even the most benign
34
differential treatment.
Second, even if a court is willing to rule
education a fundamental right, judges—and indeed the plaintiffs
themselves—have struggled to define the proper meaning of “equity” in
35
the school finance context. For instance, proponents of the equity
36
theory in California’s Serrano litigation suggested a definition aimed at
offering courts what they believed would be a judicially manageable
standard: “fiscal neutrality,” or the concept that the revenues available
to a school district should depend only on the wealth of the state as a
37
whole and not on the property wealth of the individual district. But
some advocates responded that disadvantaged children actually need
additional resources to reach socially desirable levels of educational
success—a kind of “vertical equity” that distributes resources according
31. See id. at 40.
32. ALLAN R. ODDEN & LAWRENCE O. PICUS, SCHOOL FINANCE: A POLICY
PERSPECTIVE 29 (2d ed. 2000).
33. See Heise, supra note 24, at 571.
34. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 37 (explaining that “the logical
limitations on appellees’ nexus theory are difficult to perceive. How, for instance, is
education to be distinguished from the significant personal interests in the basics of decent
food and shelter?”).
35. See William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When “Adequate” Isn’t: The Retreat from Equity
in Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 EMORY L.J. 545, 594 (2006) (describing
competing definitions of “equality” in school finance).
36. Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 940 (Cal. 1979) (noting defendants argument that
“the trial court employed inappropriate criteria insofar as it focused on the notion of so called
‘fiscal neutrality’”).
37. See John E. Coons et al., Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test
for State Financial Structures, 57 CAL. L. REV. 305, 319–21 (1969) (promoting the idea of
“district power equalizing,” an approach that involves using back-end state level
redistribution of school funding to ensure that school expenditures are not determined by
district wealth).
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to student needs. The problem with vertical equity, however, is not
only that it is facially unequal in the first instance, but also that it is
difficult to administer. For once a court agrees to impose a remedy
based upon vertical equity, upon what basis should it rely to authorize
or limit how much more money a low-income school or student should
receive than an affluent one?
Equity lawsuits also encountered a third, related problem: even in
states where plaintiffs prevailed on equity grounds, the political fallout
was often severe among the states’ wealthiest residents who were no
longer able to direct their local property tax payments to their local
schools. In California, for example, wealthy taxpayers responded to the
39
state supreme court’s order in Serrano v. Priest to redistribute funding
equitably among school districts by cutting statewide property tax
40
rates, effectively reducing the quality of education provided to all
41
children. Thus, the lesson from California is that even if school funding
is equalized, the equity theory does nothing to prevent a state from
42
“leveling down” school funding to some equally insufficient amount.
As the California Supreme Court itself recognized:
What the Serrano court imposed as a California
constitutional requirement is that there must be
uniformity of treatment between the children of the
various school districts in the State. . . . If such uniformity
of treatment were to result in all children being provided
a low-quality educational program, or even a clearly
inadequate educational program, the California
43
Constitution would be satisfied.
Lastly, equity litigation has been rejected in many courts in part out
of a concern that education is itself a public policy matter over which
legislatures, not courts, should be granted plenary authority. As the
38. Koski & Reich, supra note 35, at 610.
39. 557 P.2d 929, 940, 958 (1976).
40. William A. Fischel, How Serrano Caused Proposition 13, 12 J.L. & POL. 607, 620–21
(1996).
41. JON SONSTELIE ET AL., PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL., FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE?
SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM IN CALIFORNIA 4 (2000), available at http://www.ppic.org/
content/pubs/report/R_200JSR.pdf (concluding that California children are worse off after
the Serrano plaintiffs victory).
42. See Koski & Reich, supra note 35, at 591.
43. Serrano, 557 P.2d at 943 n.28.
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Supreme Court observed in Rodriguez, to find education a fundamental
right would jeopardize separation of powers, usurping the “legislative
44
role . . . for which the Court lacks both authority and competence.” At
the heart of this critique of judicial involvement in equity litigation—a
critique that has also been levied against adequacy lawsuits—is the idea
that a state’s elected representatives are better suited than judges to
make determinations as to desirable educational goals and resource
45
distribution.
B. The Adequacy Theory
After losing on state equal protection grounds in many states,
46
advocates turned to a different litigation theory: the adequacy theory.
Rather than relying on state equal protection clauses, the legal hook for
adequacy lawsuits is the education clause present in state constitutions,
which typically requires states to provide a system of public schools and
47
often characterizes the required system as “thorough” and “efficient.”
The basic argument is that these clauses compel the state to do more
than simply open up schools and demand student attendance; the state
must actually ensure that some meaningful level of education is offered
in the schools. In practice today, adequacy claims are typically raised
48
alongside equity arguments, and there are strong ties between the
49
two. But adequacy claims have garnered greater success than equity
claims, at least at the liability stage: of the thirty-two state courts to rule
on adequacy arguments, twenty-one have found state funding schemes
50
to violate their respective constitutions.
44. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 31 (1973).
45. Matt Brooker, Riding the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: Navigating
Troubled Waters, 75 UMKC L. REV. 183, 222–23 (2006).
46. The last equity lawsuits to prevail in state high courts occurred in 1994 in Arizona
and North Dakota; since that time, successful school finance suits have come under the
adequacy theory instead. See Heise, supra note 24, at 579–85; see also Michael Heise, State
Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the “Third Wave”: From Equity to Adequacy, 68
TEMP. L. REV. 1151, 1168–74 (1995) [hereinafter Heise, State Constitutions].
47. William E. Sparkman, The Legal Foundations of Public School Finance, 35 B.C. L.
REV 569, 572–73 (1994).
48. See, e.g., Bonner v. Daniels, 907 N.E.2d 516, 520–22 (Ind. 2009) (rejecting both
adequacy and equity challenges raised simultaneously by plaintiffs).
49. See Laurie Reynolds, Full State Funding of Education as a State Constitutional
Imperative, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 749, 750 (2009) (arguing “it would be a mistake to exaggerate
the doctrinal differences between” equity and adequacy suits).
50. See NATIONAL ACCESS NETWORK, EDUCATION ADEQUACY LIABILITY
DECISIONS SINCE 1989 (2009), http://www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/New_Charts/11_2009
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The primary difference between equity and adequacy suits is notable
in the remedy requested under each theory. Unlike an equity lawsuit,
which seeks a remedy that is relativistic in its nature, an adequacy
lawsuit asks the state to provide all schools with some absolute, base
level of resources sufficient to provide a constitutionally adequate
51
education, however the court may define that level. A situation where
wealthy school districts outspend their low-income counterparts thus
does not necessarily violate a state’s duty under an adequacy lawsuit so
long as the low-income schools have adequate educational resources as
defined by the court.
By seeking a court order declaring some absolute level of education
that the state must offer and providing students and their schools the
resources necessary to deliver it, adequacy litigants hoped to avoid
many of the legal and practical problems associated with equity
52
litigation. For instance, a court that finds for plaintiffs on adequacy
grounds does not face the same fear that, in doing so, it may open up the
door to spillover effects in other social programs because an adequacy
ruling can be grounded in the unique text of a state constitution’s
educational provision as opposed to some open-ended concept of
53
fundamental interests under the Equal Protection Clause. Moreover, a
court-ordered adequacy remedy does not need to define the thorny
54
concept of “equality” with regard to school resources. And neither
must it necessarily confront the same potential political backlash from
wealthy taxpayers who often pay the biggest price in equity remedies as
55
their tax dollars get redistributed to lower-income neighborhoods.
But even as the adequacy theory avoids some of the definitional
problems associated with equity lawsuits, it faces a substantial, different
definitional challenge. Once a court reaches the merits of an adequacy
claim, the court is asked to define that “adequate” level of education to
56
which all children in a state are entitled in the first instance.

ed_ad_equacyliability.pdf.
51. See Thro, supra note 21, at 602. But see Ryan, supra note 21, at 1232 (arguing that
remedies in adequacy litigation have not only been about absolute funding levels and have
indeed considered relative funding disparities).
52. See Heise, State Constitutions, supra note 46, at 1168.
53. See Koski, supra note 21, at 1233.
54. See Heise, State Constitutions, supra note 46, at 1169.
55. See Koski, supra note 21, at 1233.
56. See Ryan, supra note 20 at 1223 (“The basic approach of adequacy cases, at least in
theory, is to define the outcomes that constitute an adequate education . . . .”).
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Opponents of the adequacy theory contend that judges are poorly suited
to create such a definition, particularly in comparison with legislative
bodies that have the ability to conduct hearings and control the purse
strings, and who are ultimately accountable to the people via the
57
electoral process.
Acceding to this concern, several state courts have relied upon the
U.S. Supreme Court’s political question doctrine to reject adequacy
suits, ruling that their constitutional education clauses do not create
judicially manageable standards absent an initial policy determination,
58
which the separation of powers forbids. The Rhode Island Supreme
Court expressed this view succinctly when it rejected the plaintiffs’
adequacy challenge in City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, declaring that
“[b]ecause the Legislature is endowed with virtually unreviewable
discretion in this area, plaintiffs should seek their remedy in that forum
59
rather than in the courts.”
Yet concerns over justiciability have not been persuasive to most of
the courts where adequacy litigation has been brought. In fact, only
eight of the thirty-two states to consider adequacy challenges have
refused to reach the merits of adequacy claims on account of
60
justiciability.
The vast majority of courts have rejected state
defendants’ non-justiciability arguments, reasoning that to decline to
address plaintiffs’ challenges would amount to an abdication of the
court’s essential responsibility to interpret the meaning of the state
61
constitution. The Arkansas Supreme Court explained its rationale for
57. See Brooker, supra note 45, at 184 (arguing that courts should respect constitutional
separation of powers principles by refusing to entertain school finance claims altogether).
58. See, e.g., Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (Ill. 1996) (citing
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)) (“To hold that the question of educational quality is
subject to judicial determination would largely deprive the members of the general public of a
voice in a matter which is close to the hearts of all individuals in Illinois.”); see also Bonner v.
Daniels, 907 N.E.2d 516, 522 (Ind. 2009) (concluding that the framers did not create a
constitutional right to be educated to a certain standard and noting that the matter should be
handled by the General Assembly, not the courts); Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch.
Funding v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 407–08 (Fla. 1996) (dismissing adequacy claim out of
concern for separation of powers).
59. 662 A.2d 40, 45 (R.I. 1995).
60. The eight states are Alabama, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Nebraska, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. See MICHAEL A. REBELL, COURTS & KIDS: PURSUING
EDUCATIONAL EQUITY THROUGH THE STATE COURTS 22–29 (2009) (stating that seven of
the eight states, excluding Indiana, had denied to reach the merits on the basis of
justiciability). After the time of the above publication, Indiana also denied relief on the basis
that there did not exist a judicially manageable standard. See Bonner, 907 N.E.2d at 518.
61. Michael Rebell offers a thorough account of the general view among state courts
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reaching the merits of an adequacy lawsuit by declaring, “[t]his court’s
refusal to review school funding under our state constitution would be a
complete abrogation of our judicial responsibility and would work a
62
severe disservice to the people of this state.”
Indeed, some legal
scholars have gone so far as to observe that the justiciability doctrine is
itself inherently flawed for its failure to consider the judiciary’s proper
63
role in our constitutional democracy.
Nevertheless, even though most state courts have shown a general
willingness to consider adequacy challenges, history also demonstrates
that once a court jumps into the adequacy thicket, its involvement may
be protracted, difficult, and highly politicized. In New Jersey, for
instance, the landmark Abbott v. Burke line of cases spanned twenty64
four years and involved twenty discrete decisions by the state’s courts.
And although the Abbott cases have produced significant gains for
65
school children, not every court to maintain its jurisdiction over a
prolonged period is rewarded for its efforts. In Ohio, the state’s high
court issued four rulings over thirteen years, each affirming the right to
an adequate education and demanding legislative compliance—but each
66
order went unheeded by recalcitrant lawmakers. The power struggle
between the Ohio Supreme Court and General Assembly was so intense
that at different points the legislature proposed to strip the court of
jurisdiction altogether, ignore the court’s orders outright, and even
67
impeach justices who ruled with the majority. In the end, Ohio’s high
that adequacy challenges are indeed justiciable in Courts & Kids: Pursuing Education Equity
Through the State Courts. See REBELL, supra, note 60, at 23–29.
62. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 of Phillips County v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 484
(Ark. 2002).
63. See Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question,” 79 NW. U. L.
REV. 1031, 1059–60 (1984); see also Michael E. Tigar, Judicial Power, The “Political Question
Doctrine” and Foreign Relations, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1135, 1141–52 (1970).
64. Education Law Center, Abbott v. Burke Decisions, http://www.edlawcenter.org/
ELCPublic/AbbottvBurke/AbbottDecisions.htm (last visited May 18, 2011). The Abbott
cases concluded in May 2009 when the New Jersey Supreme Court terminated its prior
remedial order in response to the New Jersey legislature’s weighted student funding formula.
The decision was hailed by some as the long-overdue end of the Abbott legacy of cases. See
Brian Donahue, New Jersey Supreme Court Scraps Abbot v. Burke, NJ.COM, May 28, 2009,
http://www.nj.com/ledgerlive/index.ssf/2009/05/new_jersey_supreme_court_scrap.html.
65. For a discussion of the benefits from New Jersey’s Abbott cases, see LINDA
DARLING-HAMMOND, THE FLAT WORLD & EDUCATION: HOW AMERICA’S COMMITMENT
TO EQUITY WILL DETERMINE OUR FUTURE 122–30 (2010).
66. For a detailed explication of Ohio’s saga, see Larry J. Obhof, DeRolph v. State and
Ohio’s Long Road to an Adequate Education, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 83, 84 (2005).
67. Id. at 85.

12. TANG_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1210

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

8/13/2011 9:26 PM

[94:1195

court threw up its hands and terminated jurisdiction despite finding an
68
ongoing constitutional violation, with little educational progress to
show for its efforts.
The most recent scorecard for adequacy lawsuits suggests that,
although the theory is still very much alive, success is far from a
foregone conclusion. Since 2009, six of the eleven states to issue
69
decisions on adequacy litigation have ruled against the plaintiffs.
Perhaps the economic downturn has played a role in this development,
or perhaps it is just a minor bump in the road and not indicative of any
major trend. But this much is for certain: measuring the success of
school finance litigation by reference to only pro-plaintiff liability
decisions is only a partial metric. As plaintiffs’ experiences in Ohio and
California demonstrate, persuading a court that a state has violated its
constitutional duty to provide an adequate or equitable education is
only the beginning of the battle. The true outcome of the battle—
whether children are provided with the quality of educational
opportunity that they need to prepare them for lasting social, civic, and
economic success—depends upon the extent to which the remedy
68. DeRolph v. State, 780 N.E.2d 529, 530 (2002).
69. See Bonner v. Daniels, 907 N.E.2d 516, 518 (Ind. 2009) (ruling an adequacy challenge
non-justiciable for lack of judicially manageable standards); Montoy v. Kansas, No. 92-032,
slip op. (Kan. Feb. 12, 2010) (rejecting plaintiffs motion to reopen jurisdiction under its prior
holding due to new statewide school funding system); Comm. for Educ. Equality v. State, 294
S.W.3d 477, 489 (Mo. 2009) (finding that the adequate education owed under the Missouri
constitution was limited to the constitution’s narrow guarantee that 25% of state revenue be
directed towards schools); Abbott v. Burke, 971 A.2d 989, 992–93 (N.J. 2009) (releasing the
state from its duty to comply with prior court order of increased funding for so-called Abbott
districts); Pendelton Sch. Dist. v. State, 200 P.3d 133, 141–42, 145 (Or. 2009) (concluding that
the state had failed to fund its schools at a constitutionally sufficient level but refusing to issue
a judicial order to compel the legislature to comply with its funding duty); Davis v. State, No.
06-244, slip op. (S.D. Cir. Ct. 2009), http://lakeherman.org/coralhei/blogdocs/SchoolFunding
RulingProposed2009.pdf(Circuit court opinion finding the right to an adequate education
already fulfilled in South Dakota). In the same time period, plaintiffs in five states
experienced positive outcomes: Lobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358, 362, 376 (Colo. 2009) (finding
plaintiffs’ adequacy claims justiciable and remanding to the lower court); Conn. Coal. for
Justice in Educ. Funding v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 253 (Conn. 2010) (finding the Connecticut
Constitution to guarantee children an adequate education defined by civic and economic
preparedness); Citizens for Strong Sch. v. Florida Bd. of Educ., No. 09-CA-4534, at 6 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Aug. 25, 2010) (rejecting the state’s motion to dismiss and holding justiciable the
plaintiffs’ allegation that the state is denying school children their right to a “high quality
education” as promised under a 1998 constitutional amendment); Olson v. Guindon, 771
N.W.2d 318, 323–24 (S.D. 2009) (finding school district’s adequacy challenge justiciable but
remanding for a decision on the merits); McCleary v. State, No. 07-2-02323-2, slip. op. at 57–
65 (Wash. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 2010) (finding the state’s school finance system to be in violation
of the state’s constitutional duty to provide an adequate education).
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ultimately enacted actually meets society’s ever-evolving educational
demands. It is to this issue that I turn my focus next.
III. THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH TO
SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION
By most accounts, the past four decades of school finance litigation
have produced demonstrable benefits for disadvantaged children. The
experience of students in New Jersey after the Abbott line of cases offers
one positive example. After the state supreme court’s 1997 ruling
ordering a rough equalization of funding levels between the state’s
70
neediest schools and the state’s wealthiest schools, New Jersey’s
disadvantaged children made substantial gains in narrowing pre-existing
71
academic achievement gaps. Progress of this sort does not appear to
be limited to New Jersey. One study of educational expenditure
patterns across 10,000 school districts revealed, for instance, that courtordered remedies substantially diminished inequality among districts
72
while increasing overall school spending. And though a handful of
scholars argue that the additional funding secured by litigation has done
little to improve student outcomes—that, in short, money doesn’t
matter—this is an argument that many in the academic community have
73
rejected.
70. See Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417, 421, 423 (N.J. 1997).
71. See DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 65, at 122–30.
72. See William N. Evans et al., The Impact of Court-Mandated School Finance Reform,
in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 72, 75, 93
(Helen F. Ladd et al. eds, 1999); see also Sheila E. Murray et al., Education-Finance Reform
and the Distribution of Education Resources, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 789, 789–90 (1998)
(studying sixteen states to conclude that “successful litigation reduced inequality by raising
the spending in the poorest districts while leaving spending in the richest districts
unchanged”).
73. The argument that money does not matter for improving educational outcomes is
most commonly associated with Eric Hanushek who suggested in his seminal article in 1986
that school spending has little impact on student learning, and who has renewed that claim on
numerous occasions since. See Herbert J. Walberg, High-Poverty, High-Performance Schools,
Districts, and States, in COURTING FAILURE: HOW SCHOOL FINANCE LAWSUITS EXPLOIT
JUDGES’ GOOD INTENTIONS AND HARM OUR CHILDREN 80, 94 (Erik A. Hanushek &
Alfred A. Lindseth, eds. 2006). See generally ERIC A. HANUSHEK & ALFRED A. LINDSETH,
SCHOOLHOUSES, COURTHOUSES, AND STATEHOUSES: SOLVING THE FUNDINGACHIEVEMENT PUZZLE IN AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2009); Eric A. Hanushek, The
Economics of Schooling: Production and Efficiency in Public Schools, 24 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 1141 (1986). For a thorough rebuttal of these arguments, see DARLINGHAMMOND, supra note 65, at 99–130; REBELL, supra note 60, at 33–35. See generally
MICHAEL A. REBELL & JOSEPH J. WARDENSKI, THE CAMPAIGN FOR FISCAL EQUITY, INC.,
OF COURSE MONEY MATTERS: WHY THE ARGUMENTS TO THE CONTRARY NEVER ADDED
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Knowing in broad terms that funding inequality has gone down
while overall spending has gone up does not, however, tell us much
about the extent to which school finance litigation has been truly
successful, or even what constitutes “success” at any particular
74
moment.
After all, just what counts as a quality education—the
ultimate goal of any school finance lawsuit—is a dynamic concept that
changes over time as new economic realities and technological
75
developments influence our society.
The meaning of a quality
education is also deeply influenced by political actors and policy changes
76
Under any meaningful
in the education reform arena generally.
definition of success, therefore, school finance litigation must adapt and
evolve with changing notions of educational quality to ensure that
children have access to an education that will prepare them for the
future. Put another way, a school finance remedy that constitutes
success today may be far from sufficient thirty years from now.
Accordingly, the impact of equity and adequacy school finance
litigation on today’s students should be evaluated in light of the
dominant policy trend over the past two decades of school reform: the
rise of the standards-based reform movement. Unlike the school policy
arena that existed when school finance litigation was in its early strides,
the standards movement has created a present-day policy realm where
states actually have defined the quality of education that students are
expected to receive and schools are expected to impart. The states have
done so by adopting academic content standards, intended largely to
define the skills and information that a state’s children “must know to
77
succeed in the knowledge economy of the 21st century.”
These
standards have also been accompanied in many states by a new form of
economic analysis, the costing-out study, which is designed to determine
the cost of providing children with the quality of education promised
78
under a state’s standards.
UP (2004), available at http://www.schoolfunding.info/resource_center/research/Money
MattersFeb2004.pdf. Conclusively resolving this argument goes beyond the scope of this
Article, and so I proceed here under the presumption that money well spent can have a
positive impact on student outcomes.
74. For a discussion of possible definitions of success in school finance litigation, see
REBELL, supra note 60, at 30–39.
75. See id. at 35.
76. See id. at 62.
77. State of the Union Address, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress, 1
PUBLIC PAPERS 111 (Feb. 4, 1997).
78. See A Costing Out Primer, supra note 17.
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Yet, as I show below, even in states where equity and adequacy
lawsuits have resulted in plaintiffs’ liability victories, those victories have
not produced the desired results. Across the nation, statewide school
expenditure levels overwhelmingly remain lower than the amounts that
costing-out studies suggest are necessary to provide children with the
education described in state standards. It is this fundamental and
persistent gap—between how much states actually spend and how much
they ought to spend in accordance with their own standards—that
creates the need for a new approach to school finance litigation. Before
turning to that gap, however, I provide a brief overview of the
development of the standards-based reform movement as well as the
costing-out studies that have accompanied the standards.
A. Standards-Based Reform and Costing-Out Analyses
In broad strokes, the standards-based reform movement, an
approach first articulated in the academic literature by Jennifer O’Day
and Marshall Smith in the early 1990s, aims to improve educational
outcomes by setting academic standards for what children should learn
in school and by focusing educational programs on the attainment of
79
those standards. Although a few states began to enact standards in a
piecemeal fashion in the late 1980s, the 2001 federal No Child Left
Behind Act brought the concept of standards-based reform to center
stage by requiring all states, in exchange for federal funding, to set
standards for what students should learn by grade level and to test
80
students regularly to see whether those standards had been reached.
Although the annual testing requirement has been the cause of
considerable consternation among many in the school reform
81
community, and although numerous conservatives have decried the
82
increased federal role in schools, the core concept of standards and
83
accountability appears to be here to stay.
79. Jennifer A. O’Day & Marshall S. Smith, Systemic Reform and Educational
Opportunity, in DESIGNING COHERENT EDUCATION POLICY: IMPROVING THE SYSTEM 250,
251–52, 273–79 (Susan H. Fuhrman ed., 1993).
80. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–8803 (2006); see also, Ryan, supra note 21, at 1227–28.
81. See, e.g., DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 65, at 71–98.
82. See, e.g., Neal McCluskey, End, Don’t Mend, No Child Left Behind, CATO
INSTITUTE, Sept. 24, 2007, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=8712; Del Stover,
Ravitch Decries Reformers Seeking to Divide, NSBA.ORG, Feb. 6, 2011, http://schoolboard
news.nsba.org/category/nclb/.
83. See, e.g., Sam Dillon, Obama to Seek Sweeping Changes in “No Child’ Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2010, at A1 (noting proposed changes to the No Child Left Behind Act but
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In drawing up statewide academic content standards, many states
have sought to design rigorous and detailed grade-by-grade guidelines
that capture the essential knowledge and skills that young people should
be expected to learn and educators are expected to teach for students to
84
succeed in their future careers.
State lawmakers, in turn, have
proceeded to use the standards as building blocks for other programs
that make up the state school systems, tying testing and accountability,
teacher certification, curriculum frameworks, and even textbook
85
selection to the achievement of the standards. But not all states have
been so demanding in setting standards; a number of school reform
experts argue that quite a few states have actually established middling
86
expectations for what their children should be expected to learn.
In response to this race to the bottom among state standards, a
coalition of states, supported by the Obama administration, have set out
to create a common core of academic standards that could be applied
87
uniformly across states that choose to participate. This common core
standards initiative aims to create standards “designed to be robust and
relevant to the real world, reflecting the knowledge and skills that our
88
young people need for success in college and careers.” The initiative’s
considerable progress in the face of conservative opposition—at last
count, no fewer than twenty-seven states have indicated their intent to
adopt the national standards—signals just how entrenched standards89
based reform has become.
The continued development of state standards has also enabled

that standards and accountability will remain its centerpiece, including a proposal to adopt
voluntary national standards).
84. See, e.g., Cal. Educ. Code § 60605(a)(2)(A) (West 2003). The statute orders the
State Board of Education to ensure that the state’s academic content standards are “based on
the knowledge and skills that pupils will need in order to succeed in the information-based,
global economy of the 21st century.” Id.
85. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
86. See CHESTER E. FINN, JR. ET AL., THOMAS B. FORDHAM FOUND., 2006: THE STATE
OF STATE STANDARDS 9–12 (2006), available at http://www.thequestinstitute.com/curricdev/
docs/support/State%20of%20State%20Standards%202006%20FINAL.pdf; Paul E. Peterson
& Frederick M. Hess, Few States Set World-Class Standards: In Fact, Most Render the Notion
of Proficiency Meaningless, 8 EDUC. NEXT 70, 70, 72–73 (2008) available at, http://www.aei.
org/docLib/20080527_FewStatesSet.pdf.
87. See Common Core State Standards Initiative, http://www.corestandards.org (last
visited May 18, 2011).
88. See id.
89. See Tamar Lewin, States Embrace Core Standards for the Schools, N.Y. TIMES, July
21, 2010, at A1.
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researchers to produce estimates regarding the cost of providing the
education that the standards describe. More than two dozen states have
commissioned costing-out studies for this purpose, occasionally in
90
response to court orders.
Although numerous methodological
approaches exist for performing the studies, the two major ones have
been the “professional judgment” and “successful school district”
approaches, which consider the views of expert educators and the
91
amounts spent in a state’s high-achieving schools respectively. Some
commentators have criticized the role that costing-out studies have
played in recent debates over school spending, arguing that the studies
92
are too imprecise to deserve serious attention. But even to the extent
that these criticisms may have merit, they counsel that policymakers
bear in mind the limitations of costing-out studies, not that the studies
should be disregarded altogether.
In theory, the rise of statewide academic content standards,
combined with empirical analyses of the cost of providing education in
accordance with those standards, should have provided proponents of
adequacy litigation with a neat and perhaps persuasive answer to that
thorny question raised by the courts: what does it mean to provide an
93
adequate education? Indeed, plaintiffs in many states suggested in
some form that the courts should look to legislatively enacted content
94
standards as a definition of educational adequacy. But in reality, even
though several courts have considered state content standards to be
95
relevant to their ultimate definitions of adequacy, only one state court
90. For an overview of costing-out analyses see A Costing Out Primer, supra note 17.
See also McDonald, supra note 25, at 79–90.
91. A Costing Out Primer, supra note 17.
92. See Robert Costrell et al., What Do Cost Functions Tell Us About the Cost of an
Adequate Education?, 83 PEABODY J. EDUC. 198, 198, 199–200 (2008). But see James W.
Guthrie & Richard Rothstein, Enabling “Adequacy” to Achieve Reality: Translating
Adequacy Into State School Finance Distribution Arrangements, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY
IN EDUCATION, supra note 72, at 228–46 (1999) (explaining the value that costing-out studies
have in adequacy litigation).
93. See, e.g., James S. Liebman, Implementing Brown in the Nineties: Political
Reconstruction, Liberal Recollection, and Litigatively Enforced Legislative Reform, 76 VA. L.
REV. 349, 377–78 (1990) (suggesting that states standards should be used in school finance
cases as a measure of what is a “minimally adequate education”).
94. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 332 (N.Y. 2003)
(rejecting the argument raised by amici that the state’s regent learning standards should be
used to define a “sound basic education”).
95. See REBELL, supra note 60, at 62–64 (noting that “[a]t times, legislatively enacted
state academic standards have strongly influenced, without fully determining, the content of
the constitutional standards that were ultimately formulated by the state courts”).
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has formally defined the adequate level of education owed to children
under the state’s constitution explicitly in terms of the legislative
96
standards. Most courts that have created definitions of educational
adequacy have instead done so on their own, typically basing their
definitions on comparative assessments of successful school districts
97
within a state. But the bottom line, as Professor James Ryan observes,
is that “[c]ourts have not yet taken advantage of the standards
98
movement in school finance cases.”
The fact that the courts have not defined educational adequacy in
terms of legislative standards would not be a problem for advocates and
children if the judicially-fashioned definitions promised a higher quality
of educational opportunity than the standards provided by state
legislatures. Unfortunately, that has not been the case. To begin with,
the eleven state courts that have ruled against plaintiffs in their
99
adequacy cases and the eighteen states yet to hear adequacy challenges
have, of course, not ordered any relief to children along any definition
of educational adequacy. Even in states where plaintiffs have prevailed,
the courts have generally fashioned definitions of educational adequacy
that, as a normative matter, fall beneath the quality of education state
policymakers have otherwise enshrined in state standards. For instance,
many courts have described the nature of the state’s duty to provide an
adequate education using relatively undemanding terms such as a
100
101
“minimally adequate education” or a “sound basic education.”
96. See Montoy v. State, 112 P.3d 923, 939–40 (Kan. 2005) (per curiam); see also Ryan,
supra note 21, at 1233.
97. See Ryan, supra note 21, at 1238 (observing that standards have not gained traction
as a legal definition of educational adequacy because courts would have to fundamentally
change their concept of school finance litigation from one concerned with comparability to
one concerned with absolute resource distribution). It should be noted, however, that the
relationship has occasionally gone in the other direction; some state legislatures have
considered judicial adequacy definitions in fashioning their own content standards in turn.
The Kentucky legislature responded to the state supreme court’s definition of educational
adequacy issued in Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989), by
enacting the Kentucky Education Reform Act, which set for statewide learning goals largely
based on the court’s decision. See REBELL, supra note 60, at 60–62.
98. Ryan, supra note 21, at 1233.
99. See EDUCATION ADEQUACY LIABILITY DECISIONS, supra note 50.
100. Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540–41 (S.C. 1999).
101. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 664–67 (N.Y. 1995);
Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255, 258 (N.C. 1997); see also Hornbeck v. Somerset County
Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 776 (Md. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the state constitution’s
“thorough and efficient” clause creates a legislative duty to provide the state’s youth with a
“basic public school education”).
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Some courts have construed state education clauses to require such a
minimal bar of adequacy that no relief is necessary at all. In Texas, for
example, the state’s high court ruled in 2005 that although the state
constitution did impose a duty upon the state to guarantee students the
right to an adequate education, the nature of that duty was so minimal
102
that the state had already satisfied it. As the court noted, “[t]he public
education system need not operate perfectly; it is adequate if districts
are reasonably able to provide their students the access and opportunity
103
the district court described.”
B. An Empirical Analysis: What States Need to Spend vs.
How Much They Actually Spend
The proof that adequacy and equity victories have not increased
educational resources sufficiently lies not just in the guarded definitions
of adequacy that many courts have issued, but also in the empirical data.
Put succinctly, school funding levels, both in states where plaintiffs have
prevailed and in states where they have not, continue to fall beneath the
amount that experts conclude is needed to offer children the education
that the states’ own standards require. To demonstrate this, I have
compiled data in the table below from twenty-two states where costing104
out studies have been performed over the past decade. The table lists
for each state the estimated per-pupil cost in 2008-adjusted dollars of
providing a state’s children with the quality of education described in
the state’s standards. The table then compares those estimates against
105
each state’s actual 2008 per-pupil spending amount.
As the table

102. Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 762, 799 (Tex.
2005).
103. Id. at 787; see also Comm. for Educ. Equality v. State, 294 S.W.3d 477, 489 (Mo.
2009) (holding that the state did have a duty to provide an adequate free public education,
but that this duty was satisfied so long as the state abided by a provision in the state
constitution requiring that no less than twenty-five percent of the state revenue be
appropriated to public education).
104. The data in the table is derived from two main sources. For costing out estimates of
the per-pupil spending levels needed to provide an education in line with state standards I
drew on studies available on the National Access Network’s website. See National Access
Network, Costing Out: Fact Sheets, http://www.schoolfunding.info/policy/CostingOut/
factsheetslist.php3 (last visited May 18, 2011). I then adjusted these estimates into 2008
dollars using a Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index inflation calculator. For the
actual 2008 school spending data I relied on the Census Bureau’s June 2010 Public Education
Finances report. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PUBLIC EDUCATION FINANCES 2008, at xiii
(2010), available at http://www2.census.gov/govs/school/08f33pub.pdf.
105. Comparing the totals in 2008 dollars ensures that the analysis allows each state a
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shows, in nineteen out of the twenty-two states analyzed, current
spending is less than the amount necessary to provide children with an
education that would comply with the state’s own standards.

Plaintiffs
Victory?

Year
Studied

Estimated
Cost of
Adequate
Education
(year of
study)

Arizona

Mixed

2002–2003

$7,628

Arkansas

Yes

2000–2001

$7,461

$9,070

$8,541

yes

California

Yes

2003–2004

$9,912

$11,297

$9,863

yes

Colorado

No

2004–2005

$9,798

$10,801

$9,079

yes

Connecticut

Yes

2003–2004

$14,974

$17,066

$13,848

yes

Hawaii

No

2004–2005

$10,117

$11,153

$11,800

no

State

Estimated
Cost of
Adequate
Education
(2008
Dollars)

Actual
Per Pupil
Spending
in 2008

Gap
?

$8,925

$7,608

yes

Indiana

No

2001–2002

$7,142

$8,547

$9,036

no

Kansas

Yes

2005–2006

$8,529

$9,721

$9,667

yes

Kentucky

Yes

2003–2004

$9,112

$10,385

$8,686

yes

Maryland

Yes

1999–2000

$10,390

$12,990

$12,966

yes

Minnesota

No

2004–2005

$11,008

$12,135

$10,140

yes

Montana

Yes

2006–2007

$12,646

$13,131

$9,666

yes

Nevada

No

2003–2004

$9,385

$10,696

$8,285

yes

New Mexico

Yes

2006–2007

$9,887

$10,266

$9,068

yes

New York

No

2003–2004

$15,910

$18,133

$17,173

yes

North Dakota

Yes

2001–2002

$8,814

$10,548

$9,675

yes

Oregon

No

1999–2000

$7,954

$9,944

$9,558

yes

Pennsylvania

No

2005–2006

$11,926

$12,736

$12,035

yes

South Dakota

No

2003–2004

$10,273

$11,708

$8,367

yes

Texas

Yes

2003–2004

$7,920

$9,027

$8,320

yes

Washington

Yes

2006–2007

$11,678

$12,126

$9,099

yes

Wisconsin

Yes

2006–2007

$9,820

$10,197

$13,840

no

To be sure, estimates of how much it would cost to provide the
education enshrined in a state’s own standards vary in quality depending
on the rigor of the state costing-out studies themselves. All of the
estimates are also susceptible to the general critique that costing-out
estimates carry some margin of error and should not be tied to a precise
period of time to try to raise funding in accordance with the findings of their respective
costing-out study.
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dollar figure. Accordingly, one meta-study that sought to produce an
estimate of the overall national gap between actual spending and
required spending under state standards did so in a range. The study
concluded that it would cost between twenty-four percent and forty-six
percent more than states currently spend to provide children with an
106
education in line with state standards.
The data in the table may also suffer from the critique raised by Eric
Hanushek and others: that costing-out studies as a general matter tend
to overestimate the cost of providing an education in line with state
107
standards. But this bias, to the extent it exists, may be offset, at least
in part, by the fact that the actual expenditure data used in the table
comes from the 2007–2008 school year, and that school spending in the
years since has been adversely affected by budget cuts resulting from the
108
economic crisis.
In any event, the take-away point to be gleaned from the estimates
and the above table is not the particular dollar amount by which any
109
particular state is under-funding its schools, but rather whether the
states are spending roughly what they need to be spending to provide
children with the education that the states have defined as necessary to
succeed in the twenty-first century. And on this front the scorecard is
quite stark; by and large, the states are failing to provide children with
the educational resources they need. That thirteen of the states in the
above table have already experienced plaintiffs’ liability victories in
school funding lawsuits—and that twelve of these states still show a
110
funding shortfall —underscores that equity and adequacy may have
advanced the ball without yet reaching the endzone of educational
opportunity. The strength of this conclusion is all the more buttressed
by the recent effort to develop a common core of rigorous academic
standards to be applied across the states in line with the actual demands
106. William J. Mathis, No Child Left Behind: Costs and Benefits, 84 PHI DELTA
KAPPAN 679, 682 (2003).
107. See, e.g., Eric A. Hanushek, Science Violated: Spending Projections and the “Costing
Out” of an Adequate Education, in COURTING FAILURE, supra note 73, at 257, available at
http://edpro.stanford.edu/hanushek/admin/pages/files/uploads/hanushek.pdf.
108. See Alyson Klein, States’ Fiscal Outlook Is Still Gloomy: Report Finds More Cuts to
Education Budgets Are Looming in 31 States, EDUC. WK., June 9, 2010, at 23, 23.
109. See Costrell et al., supra note 92.
110. To be fair, one of these states, Connecticut, experienced its plaintiffs’ liability
decision in 2010, years after the costing-out study had been performed. It remains to be seen
whether the legislature will order a remedy that actually aligns state funding to the cost of
delivering the state’s standards.
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111

of the twenty-first century. If this effort succeeds, state school systems
would require even greater resources to offer children the quality of
education set out in the new, more demanding standards.
At bottom, the need for an additional approach to school finance
litigation thus encompasses two separate elements. First, in states where
adequacy and equity suits have already met some success, the rise of the
standards movement and costing-out analysis shows that there is much
more work to be done before all children have the opportunity to learn
the knowledge and skills that the states have defined as necessary to
ensure future civic, social, and economic success. To the extent that a
new school finance litigation theory can persuade the courts to go where
they have preferred not to go under traditional adequacy claims—that
is, to order their legislatures to provide sufficient resources consistent
with these state standards and not some lower bar of educational
adequacy—litigation can build on the gains that the earlier theories have
staked so far. Second, as a pragmatic matter, in states where plaintiffs
have already lost challenges premised on the equity and adequacy
theories, an additional legal theory is useful simply if it has a chance to
succeed where the other theories have not. I describe next how the
broken system theory addresses both of these concerns.
IV. THE NEW APPROACH: THE BROKEN SYSTEM THEORY OF
SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION
It is a commonplace observation among close observers of school
finance litigation that the actual text of state constitutional education
112
clauses is not predictive of litigation outcomes. Consider that out of
all the fifty state constitutions, only two actually use the word adequate
113
in describing the state’s educational duty: Florida and Georgia.
Strikingly, neither state is among the twenty-one that have agreed with
plaintiffs that a state education clause imposes a duty on the legislature
to provide an adequate education; Georgia’s high court rejected an
adequacy suit in 1981 and the Florida Supreme Court did the same
114
fifteen years later.
111. See sources cited supra notes 86–88.
112. William E. Thro, The Role of Language of the State Education Clauses in School
Finance Litigation, 2 WEST’S EDUC. L.Q. 277, 280 (1993) (noting that “the distinctions
between education clauses . . . have not made a difference in [the outcome of] school finance
cases”).
113. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
114. See Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 408
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The absence of a systematic textual approach to evaluating the
meaning of state constitutional education clauses in adequacy challenges
has led some practitioners to go so far as to conclude that “disembodied
115
parsing of constitutional terminology may be of limited or no value.”
One result of the weak textual basis for defining educational adequacy
in state constitutions may be the reluctance that many courts have
shown to create an ambitious definition of adequacy. For in the general
absence of clear constitutional text obligating the states to provide firstrate educational opportunities to all children, many courts have ruled
that the state’s educational duty is limited to meeting a “sound basic
education” or “minimally adequate education” standard, rejecting
plaintiffs’ requests to defer to the more robust adequacy concept
116
embodied in state academic content standards.
In contrast to adequacy lawsuits, the broken system claim I describe
here calls on courts to construe a specific term present in thirty-six state
constitutions that has, as yet, not been the focus of claims rooted in
117
education clauses—the term system.
In doing so, the broken system
theory offers courts a firm textual grounding that the existing litigation
theories have yet to capture. In addition, this theory places courts in a
position to order state legislatures to align their school finance
structures with the cost of providing the education set out in academic
content standards as opposed to the lower standards that prior adequacy
suits have typically engendered. Construing the term system to reach
this result is, however, far from a self-evident exercise, and so I take up
the task presently.

(Fla. 1996) (plaintiffs “failed to demonstrate . . . an appropriate standard for determining
‘adequacy’ that would not present a substantial risk of judicial intrusion into the powers and
responsibilities [of] the legislature”); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 165–66 (Ga. 1981)
(declaring that “it is primarily the legislative branch of government which must give content
to the term ‘adequate’”).
115. Paul L. Tractenberg, Education, in 3 CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY: THE AGENDA OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 293 n.137 (G. Alan Tarr &
Robert F. Williams eds., 2006).
116. See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text.
117. See Paul L. Tractenberg, Beyond Educational Adequacy: Looking Backward and
Forward Through the Lens of New Jersey, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 411, 425–26 (2008)
(suggesting that litigation relying on the meaning of “system” in state education clauses has
been the “road less traveled” than reliance on adjectives such as “thorough” and “efficient”).
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A. The Plain-Text Meaning of “System” in State
Constitutional Education Clauses
As a starting point, observe the difference between a typical state
education provision that uses the term system and a provision that does
not. California’s education clause sets forth, “The Legislature shall
provide for a system of common schools by which a free school shall be
118
kept up and supported in each district . . . .” In contrast, fourteen state
constitutions do not impose a requirement on the state to provide for a
119
For example, Missouri’s education clause
system of public schools.
declares, “[T]he general assembly shall establish and maintain free
public schools for the gratuitous instruction of all persons in this state
120
within ages not in excess of twenty-one years as prescribed by law.”
What, if anything, should be made of the presence of the word
system in California clauses where it is absent in Missouri’s provision?
It would be a stretch, undoubtedly, to argue that the mere absence of
the word system in some state constitutions automatically elevates the
term where it is present to some paramount status immediately worthy
of strict judicial enforcement; there are too many possible explanations
121
for the term’s absence for such a simple accounting.
However, what is apparent is that where the term is used, it must
carry some meaning.
The surplusage canon of constitutional
interpretation, used two centuries ago in Marbury v. Madison, demands
that “[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is
122
intended to be without effect . . . .”
The application of this rule is
particularly sensible in the context of state education clauses given that
118. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5 (emphasis added).
119. The fourteen state constitutional provisions are CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; GA.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. IX, § 3; KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 1; ME. CONST.
art. VIII, § 1; MASS. CONST. ch. V, art. III, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; MISS. CONST.
art. VIII, § 201; MO. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a); NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 1; N.H. CONST.
art. LXXXIII; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 68; and WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3.
120. MO. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a) (emphasis added). Note that the distinction between
“public” schools and “common” schools as used in the various state constitutions is a
byproduct of the historical eras in which the respective documents were drafted and is of no
moment to this analysis. See generally, CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC:
COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 1780–1860 (Eric Foner ed., 1983).
121. Neither should this Article be understood as arguing that plaintiffs lack a colorable
claim in the fourteen states that do not impose a state constitutional duty to provide for a
system of public schools. Such a claim may still exist, albeit in a weaker form that lacks the
clear textual underpinnings present in the thirty-seven states that expressly create a system
duty.
122. 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803).
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these provisions were hotly debated, revised, and adopted at
constitutional conventions wherein key elements of the respective
clauses, including the system of common schools language, were subject
123
to close scrutiny.
As George Sands, a delegate to Maryland’s 1864
constitutional convention insisted, “I want a public school system
established, and I want here in my place to do my share towards making
it absolutely impossible that the people of Maryland shall be deprived of
124
it.”
In fact, the use of the term system emerged in most state
constitutions as an intentional product of the nineteenth century
common schools movement, where lawmakers sought to
constitutionalize the requirements for a system of common schools to
make sure that opponents of public education could not backslide on
125
the concept of universal, free public education in the future.
So what constitutional standard should a court apply in a broken
system challenge—that is, what conditions must a legislature satisfy to
meet its duty to provide a system of common schools? There are three
possible standards, each one associated with a different definition of
system that a court could adopt: a weak definition, a strong definition,
and a definition in between that I will refer to as the “rational–actual”
definition.
B. The Weak Definition of System: Interconnected Constituent Parts
State defendants will argue for a weak meaning of system and thus
an undemanding duty. To buttress their argument, the states may point
to a dictionary wherein one definition of system is given as “a regularly
126
interacting or interdependent group of items forming a unified whole.”
A state defendant will argue that, under this definition, what makes an
enterprise a system is simply interconnectedness among its constituent
parts. Because the state’s schools are all functionally interrelated by
virtue of basic state policies governing curriculum frameworks, high
school graduation requirements, school finance, and other programs, the
123. For a detailed description of the history behind these clauses in state constitutions
see generally John Dinan, The Meaning of State Constitutional Education Clauses: Evidence
from the Constitutional Convention Debates, 70 ALB. L. REV. 927 (2007).
124. 1 THE DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF
MARYLAND 1233 (1864) (emphasis added).
125. For a thorough discussion of this historical development, see generally Michael A.
Rebell, Adequacy Litigations: A New Path to Equity?, in BRINGING EQUITY BACK:
RESEARCH FOR A NEW ERA IN AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL POLICY 291(Janice Petrovich &
Amy Stuart Wells eds., 2005).
126. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1269 (11th ed. 2003).
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state will argue that it already meets its duty to provide not just common
schools generally but an interconnected system of common schools.
The problem with this definition is that it defies our ordinary
understanding of what makes something a system. Indeed, a second
dictionary definition more accurately captures the ordinary meaning of
system, particularly with respect to human-made structures and
organizations such as schools. That definition describes a system as “an
organization forming a network [especially] for distributing something
127
or serving a common purpose.”
An example may be helpful to illustrate why a system must be made
up of interconnected parts that serve a “common purpose,” as opposed
to just interconnected parts without some unifying goal.
If
interconnectedness is all that is required, the United States highway
system could be referred to as a “national hiking system” because it is
interconnected in a manner such that a person could hike from Maine to
California along it. But to call our highways a national hiking system
would flout the ordinary meaning of the word system. The highways do
make up a road system, however, because that is the common purpose
for which they are designed.
The state could respond, of course, that it already meets this
interconnectedness, plus common-purpose definition because all of its
schools are aimed at educating children and it has even enacted
standards laying out a common purpose for its schools. The problem
with this argument, as I explore below, is that the ordinary meaning of
system requires more than the mere proclamation of some common
purpose unifying a system’s constituent parts; it also requires a meansend relationship between those parts and the purpose to be served.
1. The Strong Definition of System: Interconnected Parts That Actually
Accomplish the System’s Common Purpose
If the meaning of system requires both interconnectedness among a
system’s parts and some common purpose to be served by those parts,
the logical follow-up question is what kind of relationship must exist
between the system’s parts and purpose. Put another way, is it enough
for a system merely to announce a common purpose even if it is
incapable of achieving it, or must the system be designed to achieve—or
actually achieve—its purpose?
An example will help to illustrate this point: the New York City
127. Id. (emphasis added).
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subway system. Imagine that the New York City Transit Department is
to start from scratch and design a new citywide subway system,
completely demolishing the current one. The transit department
announces and makes public its new design—a state-of-the-art, clean,
and efficient subway with the purpose of enabling New Yorkers to get
from any place in the city to another in an expedient fashion. But after
the department builds the track, it has only enough money left to
construct one station where passengers can get on and off trains. As a
result, passengers can get on the beautiful new subway at that one
location and they can ride around beneath the city for however long
they want—but they can disembark only right back at the same location
where they started.
Has the New York City Transit Department created a subway
system? Our intuition is to answer that it has not. Under a second
definition of system, call it the “strong” definition, our intuition may be
guided by the sense that for a human-made structure to constitute a
system the parts of the system must be (1) interconnected with (2) a
common purpose, and (3) the system must actually achieve that common
purpose. The one-station subway satisfies the first two criteria but not
the third because it completely fails to transport New Yorkers to their
desired destinations, which, after all, is the purpose of any subway
system.
Drawing on this ambitious, strong definition of system, plaintiffs
might argue that even though the state has created programs and
policies governing its public schools that are interconnected in pursuit of
128
a common purpose (the academic content standards), it fails to meet
the third criterion of what makes up a system until students actually
attain the standards. Indeed, this outcome-oriented definition of system
may be embedded in commonplace observations that the school system
is broken, particularly where such comments are accompanied by
129
statistical evidence of lagging student achievement.
A challenge predicated on the strong definition of system could
request a court to hold unconstitutional any state school system where
students are not actually achieving the standards set out by the state as
128. For the present sake of argument, I assume that the purpose of a state’s public
school system is the achievement of academic content standards. I return to this question
below, providing evidence of state legislatures’ intent to treat the standards as the
overarching purpose for their public school systems. See infra notes 164–65.
129. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 15, at 77 (local chamber of commerce president
declared, “the [school] system is broken”).
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130

evidenced by test scores. Such a challenge could also request a court
order to remedy the school funding system so that the standards may be
achieved.
This argument may be most persuasive where state
constitutions demand the provision of an efficient or thorough system of
131
schools, because those terms connote some degree of actual success in
132
achieving a goal.
Such an argument, although potentially far-reaching in its impact on
the lowest-achieving students, comes with a major problem: a challenge
predicated on the strong definition of system will surely encounter a
response from state defendants that it demands judicial policymaking on
a public policy issue for which manageable standards may be elusive at
best. That is, for a strong system challenge to succeed, plaintiffs must
ask the court to determine a degree of student success relative to the
standards that is enough to qualify a state’s schools as a system. Does
the state provide a system only once its educational programs have
enabled a majority of its students to reach the standards? When all of
the students meet standards? Or must there be only an opportunity for
all students to meet the standards? These vexing questions may well be
of a nature best left to a democratically accountable legislature, and a
133
judge may reject the strong definition accordingly.

130. It is important to note that a challenge under the strong definition of system would
not be the same as an adequacy claim. That is, that the thrust of the strong system challenge
would not be that the standards constitute a definition of the adequate education owed under
a state constitution, but rather that a state does not provide a system of public schools until its
schools actually satisfy their purpose as set out by the legislature.
131. Six states use both of the terms “thorough” and “efficient” to describe the system of
schools to be provided. See MD. CONST. art VIII, § 1; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; N.J.
CONST. art VIII, § 4; OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2; PA. CONST. art III, § 14; and W. VA. CONST.
art. XII, § 1. Six more states use the term “efficient” alone in describing the system of schools
to be provided, see ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IX,
§ 1; ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1; KY. CONST. § 183; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1. Two states use the
term “thorough” alone. See COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2; and IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1.
132. Note that under traditional adequacy arguments, the terms thorough and efficient
have been interpreted as qualifying the minimum level of education that a state owes—not
the kind of system that a state is constitutionally required to provide. See Tractenberg, supra
note 117, at 427 (describing how a potential claim in New Jersey arguing for a duty to create
an “efficient system” of common schools could require the state to provide funding sufficient
to ensure that students are actually meeting the outcomes required in state standards).
133. But see supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text for the view that it might be
inappropriate for judges to avoid this claim on justiciability grounds.
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2. The “Rational–Actual” Definition of System: Interconnectedness
Among Parts of the System that Are Actually and Rationally Designed
to Serve a Common Purpose
Where the weak definition says too little in considering any
interconnected collection of objects to be a system even where they lack
a common purpose, the strong definition says too much by requiring a
134
system to actually achieve its common purpose. Situated in between is
a third possible definition of system—a definition that is at once
reasonable given the ordinary meaning of the word and suggestive of an
appropriate and manageable judicial standard for adjudication. This
third definition is evident upon closer examination of the dictionary
definition given above for human-made structures, that a system is “an
organization forming a network especially for . . . serving a common
135
purpose.”
To constitute a system under this definition, the
interconnected parts of an enterprise must simply be rationally designed
with a particular goal in mind: serving, or making achievable, a common
purpose.
Restated, the third definition thus holds that an organization should
be considered a system if its core parts are (1) interconnected with (2) a
common purpose, and (3) the parts are rationally and actually designed
to achieve that purpose. This “rational-actual” definition recognizes
that the parts of a system must be designed with the goal of achieving a
common purpose, but also recognizes that the system as a whole may
not always meet this purpose—the U.S. highway system is still a
highway system despite periodic traffic delays. In other words, the
rational–actual definition contemplates a looser degree of means-end fit
than the strong definition. Where the strong definition demands that
the system actually achieve its purpose, this third definition says that the
system must be only reasonably designed to achieve it.
Thus, despite its many flaws, the present-day New York City subway
system is indeed a system if it is interconnected with a shared
transportation purpose and if its core parts are rationally and actually
designed to achieve that purpose. Consistent with ordinary usage, we
134. By analogy, the strong definition may overstate what is necessary for an enterprise
to qualify as a system. We consider a railroad system to be a system even if there are
occasional delays and accidents on the tracks that prevent the system from always
accomplishing its transportation purpose.
135. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 126, at 1269
(emphasis added).
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still consider the NYC subway to be a system despite occasional service
delays. And what makes the hypothetical new one-stop-only subway
above not a system under the rational–actual definition is not the fact
that it fails wholesale to transport people but rather that a subway
structure with miles and miles of track and only one station cannot be
considered rationally designed to meet its purpose. Similarly, we do not
consider the U.S. highway system to be a “national hiking system”
because it was not designed for the actual purpose of hiking.
The rational–actual definition best captures the ordinary meaning of
the term system in the education context. When educators and
policymakers observe that a school system is broken, the crux of their
meaning is that the system is irrationally or not actually designed to
accomplish its purpose. Of course, if a core part of a school system—
such as school funding—is not designed so as to make state standards
achievable, it should not surprise lawmakers when large numbers of
students fail to meet those standards. But what stops the state’s
educational enterprise from being called a system in this scenario is the
irrational way in which the state’s program is designed, not the fact that
136
students have fallen short of the standards.
Using the rational–actual definition of system, plaintiffs can argue
that the duty to provide a system of common schools requires the state
to design educational programs in a manner that is rationally and
actually calculated to achieve the shared purpose of the academic
content standards. The state will have to satisfy both prongs of the
definition to show that it has fulfilled its duty. First, for its educational
programs to be rationally calculated to achieve academic standards, the
state will have to demonstrate that its core educational programs have
been designed in a manner that would reasonably further the
137
achievement of state content standards. Most states have, it turns out,
already tailored core educational programs such as school
accountability, curriculum, teacher certification, and so on to the
138
standards. Plaintiffs would simply request that states do the same for
their school funding structures. Second, for a challenged state policy to
136. Whether or not students are achieving the standards according to statewide test
scores may, however, factor into a judicial determination of whether a particular aspect of the
state school system was rationally and actually designed for the purpose of achieving the
state’s standards.
137. See infra Part IV.C for a more detailed discussion of what it would mean for a state
to have a rationally calculated school system.
138. See infra note 160.
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fulfill the “actually calculated” element of the rational–actual definition,
the state policy must actually, or deliberately, be designed to serve state
139
standards—an imaginary, ex-post justification will not do.
C. How State Courts So Far Have Construed the Meaning of System
It may be useful to pause for a moment and consider whether any of
the definitions of system that I have posited here align with the manner
in which state courts have construed the term in litigation thus far.
Although the courts have given scant attention to the term system to
date, the little analysis that does exist suggests that the rational–actual
definition is consistent with what courts may be likely to think; that is,
the courts that have discussed the meaning of system so far have
recognized that a state school system must serve a common purpose and
that the state’s educational programming must bear some reasonable,
actual relationship to that purpose.
Before turning to the decisions that have considered the meaning of
the term system, however, it is important to appreciate how courts have
tended to overlook the term in school finance litigation thus far.
Professor Paul Tractenberg, a leading voice in school finance litigation
over the past four decades, recently observed in the context of twentyplus years of litigation in the New Jersey Abbott line of cases that
consideration of the meaning of the word system has been a part of the
road less traveled in the long journey of school finance litigation to
140
date.
According to Tractenberg, New Jersey’s high court relied
instead on the meaning of the word thorough, which modifies system in
141
the state’s education clause.
Idaho’s Supreme Court fashioned a
142
Similarly,
definition of adequacy based largely upon the same term.
state high courts in Texas, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Arkansas have
also found it unnecessary to define the term system in their respective
school finance decisions. Each of these courts has instead reached a
pro-plaintiff liability ruling by focusing predominantly on a different
term that modifies system in each state’s constitution—the word
139. See infra Part IV.C for a more detailed discussion of what it would mean for a state
to actually design its school finance system for the purpose of achieving state standards.
140. See Tractenberg, supra note 117, at 412.
141. Id. at 420; see also N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Legislature shall provide
for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools
. . . .”).
142. Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724, 734 (Idaho 1993)
(focusing on the definition of thorough in the state constitution).
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143

efficient.
Court decisions in three states, however, have given more than
passing attention to the presence and meaning of the term system in
state education clauses. In Campbell County School District v. State,
Wyoming’s school finance case, the state’s high court looked to a
dictionary definition to understand the meaning of the state
144
constitution’s guarantee of a “system of public instruction.” Notably,
the court chose to rely upon a definition that is markedly similar to the
one referenced above in my rational–actual definition of system: “a
regularly interacting or interdependent group of items forming a unified
whole; a group of artificial objects or an organization forming a network
145
especially for distributing something or serving a common purpose.”
Indeed, the court construed the entire state education clause in a
manner strikingly similar to that which plaintiffs in a broken system
challenge might seek:
[W]e can define “a thorough and efficient system of
public schools adequate to the proper instruction of the
state’s youth” as an organization forming a network for
serving the common purpose of public schools which
organization . . . is reasonably sufficient for the
appropriate or suitable teaching/education/learning of the
146
state’s school age children.
If state standards represent “suitable teaching/education/learning”
147
for the state’s children, then it is easy to see how the Wyoming court’s
description of the state’s system duty could represent precisely the
holding that plaintiffs to a broken system challenge would want. But
because plaintiffs raised equity and adequacy challenges in Campbell

143. See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 of Phillips County v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 484
(Ark. 2002); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211–13 (Ky. 1989);
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 394–96 (Tex. 1989) Pauley v. Kelly, 255
S.E.2d 859, 876 (W. Va. 1979).
144. See 907 P.2d 1238, 1258 (Wyo. 1995); see also WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
145. Compare supra text accompanying note 135, with Campbell County Sch. Dist., 907
P.2d at 1258 (emphasis added). Note that the court also considered an 1889 definition of the
term system that was more similar to the weak definition of system, but the court ultimately
relied upon the contemporary “common purpose” definition in fashioning its description of
the state’s duty. Id.
146. Id. at 1258–59 (emphasis added).
147. See supra Part IV.B.
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and not a broken system challenge, the court in that case did not
consider whether this definition of system would necessitate a rational
and actual connection between the state’s school finance system and
state content standards.
Like the Wyoming Supreme Court, New York courts have also
interpreted the meaning of system in a fashion that evokes the rational–
actual definition. Justice Hopkins first construed the term in his partial
concurrence to the New York Appellate Division’s opinion in Levittown
Union Free School District v. Nyquist, which found the state’s school
finance structure to violate the state equal protection clause and the
148
state’s education article.
Agreeing with the majority opinion’s
conclusion that the state’s school finance program violated the
education article in the New York Constitution, Justice Hopkins wrote,
“[t]he word ‘system’ has large implications . . . a system is a whole
composed of parts in orderly arrangement according to some scheme or
149
plan.”
Justice Hopkins also referred to an applicable “more
specialized” definition: “A system is a group of components integrated to
150
The state’s system of funding schools,
accomplish a purpose.”
however, in the justice’s view, had become a “patchwork mounted on
151
patchwork, an Ossa of confusion piled on a Pelion of disorder.”
In
short, the state was in violation of its duty to provide a system of free
common schools because its funding program was such a “maze of . . .
convoluted intricacies” that its irrationality “negate[d] the existence of a
152
basic Statewide fiscal system for education.”
Later, however, in a dissenting opinion from the state’s landmark
1995 adequacy case Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, Judge Simons
described the meaning of the state constitution’s system guarantee in an
153
arguably less demanding manner than the rational–actual definition.
Describing the court’s prior holding in Levittown, Justice Simons
observed,
[T]he Levittown Court concluded that the system of
which the Constitution speaks is a framework of
148. 443 N.Y.S.2d 843, 861 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
149. Id. at 873–74 (Hopkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1971)) (emphasis added).
150. Id. at 874 n.7 (emphasis added).
151. Id. at 875.
152. Id. at 874.
153. See 655 N.E.2d 661, 678 (N.Y. 1995) (Simons, J. dissenting).
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educational programming and, implicitly, regulatory
oversight of compliance with that framework. We
concluded further that the State manifestly had
“supported and maintained” the system because State
appropriations for the New York public school system,
judged by the fiscal contributions of other States, far
exceeded those of all but two others. . . . In sum, we fully
interpreted the Education Article, concluding that the
State had met its constitutional obligation because it had
created a system—it had defined a sound basic education
154
and the facilities necessary to provide it . . . .
In other words, Judge Simons agreed that a system properly
understood must evince some common purpose, which he found the
state to have accomplished through its definition of a “sound basic
155
education.”
But rather than looking for evidence that the state’s
school finance structure was deliberately and rationally designed to
meet that common purpose, Judge Simons instead argued that the
state’s system duty was fulfilled simply because New York spent more
156
money on education than most other states.
One wonders whether
Judge Simons might have interpreted the state’s system guarantee to
require a more rationally designed school finance formula if New York’s
school expenditure levels had been lower and not greater than those of
all but two states. But, in any case, his views are expressed in only a
dissenting opinion and thus would not be dispositive for a broken
157
system claim raised in New York or elsewhere.
Finally, California’s own high court has considered the meaning of
system in a manner consistent with the rational–actual definition. First,
in an 1893 decision, Kennedy v. Miller, the court observed, “The term
‘system,’ itself, imports a unity of purpose, as well as an entirety of
operation; and the direction to the legislature to provide ‘a’ system of
common schools means one system, which shall be applicable to all the
158
common schools within the state.” Later, in Piper v. Big Pine School
District, the California Supreme Court elaborated on the state’s
calculated, rational creation of a school system aimed at achieving a

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 678–79.
See id.
Id. at 679.
Id. at 675–82.
32 P. 558, 559 (Cal. 1893) (emphasis added).
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common purpose, stating, “The public school system of this state is a
product of the studied thought of the eminent educators of this and other
159
states of the Union, perfected by years of trial and experience.”
Kennedy and Piper are thus consistent with the proposition that the
state’s educational programs must share a common purpose, and the
state must affirmatively and studiously design the school system so as to
achieve that purpose—it is not enough for the state to enact a mishmash
of educational policies and programs that incidentally share some
160
common goal.
With this language from the California Supreme Court in view, and
also considering the persuasive force of the definitions of system given
in Wyoming and New York, I turn now to a blueprint for how a broken
system claim might be litigated in California.
V. A CALIFORNIA CASE STUDY FOR LITIGATING THE
BROKEN SYSTEM CLAIM
Litigating the broken system claim encompasses at least three
essential challenges that plaintiffs will have to surmount. First, plaintiffs
must establish the scope of the duty created by the term system in their
respective state constitutional education provisions. Second, plaintiffs
must show that the system duty extends to the state’s academic content
standards; that is, that the common purpose to be served by the school
system is the standards and not some lesser goal. Third, plaintiffs must
prove that the state has failed to meet its duty to provide a system of
161
common schools as they have defined the duty in the first two steps. I
walk through these challenges presently using California as an example
in light of the recent Robles-Wong filing.
159. Piper v. Big Pine Sch. Dist. of Inyo County, 226 P. 926, 930 (Cal. 1924) (emphasis
added).
160. The California courts did not depart from the Kennedy and Piper construction of
the term system in the two school finance lawsuits that have taken place in California since:
the Serrano equity decision and a more recent case, Williams v. State, No. 312236, slip op.
(Cal. Super. Ct. July 10, 2003). In Serrano, the court did observe that it had never interpreted
the phrase “system of common schools” to “require equal school spending,” but that is not
material for the broken system theory since it does not demand equity in spending but rather
a rational alignment with the state content standards. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1248–
49 (Cal. 1971).
161. Note that a fourth step will be necessary, though not terribly challenging: plaintiffs
will have to show that California children have been harmed by the state’s violation of its
duty to provide a system of common schools. Ample evidence of the educational harm
wrought by insufficient school funding is discussed, for example, in DARLING-HAMMOND,
supra note 65, at 99–130.
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A. The State’s Duty to Provide a School System that is Rationally and
Actually Designed to Achieve a Common Purpose
The first step for plaintiffs litigating a broken system claim is to
establish the scope of the duty as it is used in their state constitution. As
discussed above, the key legal question in this task concerns the
meaning of the word system. The State will argue for a weak definition,
and plaintiffs must counter that the term’s meaning is more accurately
captured in either of the two stronger definitions. Between the two
stronger definitions, the definition that best captures the ordinary
meaning of system is the rational–actual definition, and that the State
accordingly owes a duty to provide a school system that is made up of
interconnected core educational programs that are rationally and
162
actually designed to serve a common purpose.
The Robles-Wong
complaint chooses precisely this definition in describing the nature of
California’s duty under the system of common schools clause where it
asserts:
Defendants have violated their constitutional duty to
provide and support the “system of common schools” by
failing to provide and sufficiently fund an education
finance system that is intentionally, rationally, and
demonstrably aligned with the goals and objectives of the
State’s prescribed educational program and the costs of
ensuring that all children of all needs have the
opportunity to become proficient according to the State’s
163
academic standards . . . .
To persuade the court to adopt this rational–actual definition of
system, plaintiffs should rely on the textual arguments and analogies
164
discussed above, and also on case law, both from the previously
described California cases (Kennedy and Piper) as well as other state

162. For substantive or even strategic reasons, plaintiffs could argue in the alternative
for the strong definition of system which creates a more demanding state duty—a duty to
actually ensure student success in meeting the school system’s common purpose. See
Tractenberg, supra note 117, at 427.
163. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 53, Robles-Wong v. State, No.
RG10515768 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 20, 2010) (emphasis added), available at http://fixschool
finance.org/~/media/CSF/Files/ Complaint_052010.ashx.
164. See supra Part III.A.
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165

B. The Common Purpose of the State’s System of Common Schools:
Achieving the State’s Academic Standards
To secure a remedy ordering the State to align school funding with
the actual cost of providing the quality of education described in state
standards, plaintiffs must establish that the standards are indeed the
common purpose that unifies the various elements of the State’s school
system. For if the common purpose that the system is designed to serve
is something less than the standards—such as keeping kids off the
streets or providing some minimally basic level of education—a court
may well find that the State’s educational programs are already designed
to serve that purpose in full compliance with its constitutional system
duty.
Fortunately for plaintiffs, the actions taken by state legislatures
themselves confirm the achievement of academic content standards
represents the paramount purpose of state school systems today. The
clearest indication of this intention lies in the language state legislatures
used in authorizing the development of standards. In ordering the
creation of standards in 1995, California lawmakers issued a clear
statement about the purpose those standards would serve: “[California
shall] develop and adopt a set of statewide academically rigorous
content standards and performance standards in all major subject areas
166
to serve as the basis for . . . the California education system as a whole.”
The California legislature did not stop there. Once the standards
were promulgated, lawmakers proceeded to tie educational program
after program to the standards, further demonstrating that the standards
are the overarching purpose of the entire system. California ordered its
textbooks and instructional materials, accountability, standardized tests,
graduation requirements, and teacher credentialing all to be tied to its
167
standards.
The state’s defense that the common purpose driving its school
systems is something other than the standards is thus severely undercut
165. See supra Part III.B.
166. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 60602(a)(2) (West 2003) (emphasis added).
167. See id. § 60422(a) (connecting textbooks and instructional materials to state
standards); id. §§ 60602(a)(2), 60605(a)(1)(A) (linking school accountability to standards); §
60640(f)(3)(A) (tying standardized testing to standards); id. § 60850 (tying the state’s high
school exit examination to state achievement standards); and id. § 44259(b)(3) (West 2006)
(linking teacher certification requirements to state standards).

12. TANG_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1236

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

8/13/2011 9:26 PM

[94:1195

by a litany of legislative enactments that demonstrate how the standards
are, both in law and practice, the common purpose of its school systems.
And while the state may suggest that the standards are meant to serve
only an aspirational function, such an argument is of no moment
because an aspirational purpose for a school system is a common
168
purpose nonetheless.
C. State School Finance Formulas are Neither Rationally nor Actually
Designed to Enable Students to Meet State Academic Standards
Once it is established that California has a constitutional duty to
provide a system of common schools composed of programs and policies
rationally and actually designed to effectuate their academic content
standards, the last task for plaintiffs is to show that the State’s school
funding system stands in violation of this duty. Here, the way in which
school funding is distributed in California speaks for itself. Unlike its
policies concerning curriculum, accountability, testing, textbooks,
teacher certification, and graduation requirements, which are all set in
relation to state standards, California uses school finance formulas that
are based on a hodgepodge of factors including the disjunctive threepart test in Proposition 98: revenue limits, categorical programs, and
169
political expediency in general.
Thus, the one factor that the state
must consider to meet its duty to provide a system of common schools is
one it simply does not account for in disbursing state school aid: the
actual cost of providing the state’s children with an education that would
satisfy statewide academic standards. Underscoring the irrationality of
the system, a 2007 costing-out study found that California spent 40%
less in statewide school funding than the amount that would be
170
necessary to meet the state’s own standards.
Moreover, the basic
structure of California’s school finance was enacted prior to state
171
standards.
As a result, the funding scheme cannot meet the state’s
system duty to be actually calculated for the common purpose of

168. To be sure, nothing in the broken system claim forecloses a state from lowering or
watering down standards as a response to a court order, thereby lowering its funding duty.
Ultimately, however, political safeguards are likely to prevent politicians from lowering their
standards beneath a level that is acceptable to the voting public.
169. See Kirst, supra note 12.
170. JON SONSTELIE, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL., ALIGNING SCHOOL FINANCE WITH
ACADEMIC STANDARDS: A WEIGHTED-STUDENT FORMULA BASED ON A SURVEY OF
PRACTITIONERS, at iii (2007).
171. See Kirst, supra note 12.
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172

achieving of state standards.
So strong is the evidence on these counts, in fact, that the state’s best
counter-argument may be to concede the irrational design of its funding
scheme vis-à-vis the standards and to argue instead that the duty to
create a system of common schools does not give rise to a duty to align
every state educational program with state standards. Under this
argument, the state could contend that it has discharged its system duty
by setting standards as the common purpose for its system and by
aligning only core instructional and accountability programs with those
standards. After all, the state will argue, it cannot be the case that every
state law concerning public schools must align with the standards. And
if laws concerning fuel-efficient drivers’ education, agricultural
173
education, and staff fingerprinting requirements need not align with
the standards, then likewise, neither should school funding.
This counter-argument is unlikely to prevail for two reasons. First, a
court could simply disagree and decide that the system duty does in fact
require every state educational program to be designed to rationally
serve the standards. Second, a court could draw a line between core
state policies and programs and trivial ones, requiring only those state
policies that have a substantial impact on the achievement of state
standards, such as school funding, to be aligned to those standards.
Under either rationale, the state’s duty to create a system of common
schools would extend to school finance, requiring the state to align its
funding structure to its standards.
VI. CONCLUSION
Like any untested legal theory, the cause of action I have proposed
here, rooted in a state’s constitutional duty to provide a system of
common schools, is not without potential pitfalls and challenges. I have
attempted to address some of the major challenges by using California
case law and statutes to fashion a case study above, although different
challenges may well exist in other jurisdictions.
For plaintiffs who raise a broken system cause of action, however,
there may be substantial benefits to taking on these challenges. First
off, in the fourteen states where previous school finance lawsuits raised
172. See supra Part III.A.
173. Cal. Educ. Code § 51854 (West 2006) (fuel efficient driver education law); id. § 8982
(agricultural education program); id. § 10911.5 (fingerprinting of employees having contact
with minors).
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under equity and adequacy grounds have failed, but where the state
constitutions obligate the state to provide a system of public schools, the
ability to challenge the state’s school funding program under a new
theory of liability can provide advocates with a sorely needed tool to
advance the plight of disadvantaged school children. Second, in the
states where adequacy and equity litigation has already resulted in
plaintiffs’ liability decisions, the ability to plead a broken system cause
of action can prove useful to the extent that the remedy from such a
claim—the alignment of state school aid with the cost of meeting state
standards—would exceed the existing remedies from the prior suits. As
Part II.B demonstrated above, thirteen of the fourteen states analyzed
that experienced a pro-plaintiff liability decision still spend less on K–12
education than would be necessary to provide their children with the
quality of education that state lawmakers themselves have described as
essential to civic, economic, and social success in the twenty-first
century. It is precisely this gap that the broken system theory of school
finance litigation aims to fill.
Third, the potential utility of the broken system cause of action is
strengthened inasmuch as it represents a plausible legal theory. To be
sure, only time will tell just how persuasive the courts find the theory to
be, and perhaps the fate of Robles-Wong will provide an early
indication. But to the extent the theory is firmly grounded in the
ordinary meaning of the term system present in the text of state
constitutions, and to the extent that the few courts to consider the
meaning of system have shown a willingness to construe the term in a
manner that would grant plaintiffs relief, perhaps there is reason for
advocates to be optimistic.
Lastly, where one of the primary factors that has motivated some
courts to reject adequacy and equity claims is the concern that the task
of defining educational adequacy or equity is a non-justiciable, political
175
question for which legislatures, not courts, are best suited, the broken
system cause of action leaves solely to the legislature the responsibility
of defining the quality of education that a state should provide. The
theory neither requires nor allows the court to make initial policy
determinations as to the qualitative level of education that a state must
174. These states include: Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and
Virginia. See supra note 99 (explaining eleven states have declined to reach the merits of
challenges based on adequacy grounds).
175. See EDUCATION ADEQUACY LIABILITY DECISIONS, supra note 50.
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provide or the kind of equity that is necessary to satisfy the equal
protection clause.
Thus, rather than requiring a court to consider complex evidence of
comparative educational need and spending across districts as in equity
litigation, or to weigh competing definitions of educational adequacy
that are unmoored from the text of actual state constitutional provisions
as in adequacy litigation, the work that the broken system cause of
action asks courts to do is far simpler. A judge deciding the broken
system claim needs only to construe the meaning of the term system and
whether it means what plaintiffs assert it means in line with the rational–
176
actual definition described above.
Once the meaning of system is
decided, a judge’s remaining task is simply to ensure that whatever
educational programs and policies the legislature chooses to adopt are
rationally and actually designed to serve whatever common standards
the state chooses for its schools. In performing this role, the court is
asked to apply an eminently familiar and manageable judicial standard:
177
a version of rationality review where a legislature’s actions are
presumed constitutional so long as its policies are both reasonably
calculated to serve state content standards and actually designed with
that purpose in mind.
Under this standard, a court’s task may be straightforward in
comparison to the protracted and controversial work done by courts in
school finance lawsuits past: only a policy that is either completely
unjustifiable in view of the state’s standards or that was not in fact
designed to serve the standards will be struck down. By and large,
school finance formulas used in states throughout the nation fail on both
counts, rendering the broken system argument a potentially powerful
tool in the hands of advocates who seek a day where academic standards
are more than a pipedream for the nation’s least fortunate children.

176. As I have shown above, this is a plausible result especially given that courts in
Wyoming, New York, and California have already interpreted the term system to reach a
similar conclusion. See supra Parts III.A–B.
177. The rationality review employed in the broken system claim differs from traditional
rationality review in two key respects. Instead of asking whether the challenged state policy
is rationally related to any legitimate state end, the broken system claim would first require
both a rational and actual relationship. Second, it would prevent the state from asserting any
end. A court would look for a relationship between the challenged policy and only the actual
end that the state has set for its schools, which I have argued above is the achievement of
academic content standards.

